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CODIFYING COMMON LAW: THE SELF-
CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE AND THE 
NEW JERSEY PATIENT SAFETY ACT 
Adam Blander* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, New Jersey enacted the Patient Safety Act (“the 
PSA” or “the Act”),1 requiring hospitals to engage in the 
“comprehensive reporting of adverse patient events, systematic 
analysis of their causes, and creation of solutions.”2 The Act 
was grounded in the belief that fostering “a non-punitive culture 
that focuses on improving processes rather than assigning 
blame”3 was crucial in promoting disclosure and reporting. As 
such, it provided that materials developed from a process of 
“self-critical analysis” not be discoverable nor used as evidence 
in any subsequent trial or proceeding.4 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate and Health Law and Policy Fellow, Brooklyn Law School, 
2013; B.A., McGill University, 2009. I thank Professor Frederic Bloom for 
his persistent critical feedback; the entire Journal staff for their patience and 
dedication; my father Stuart Blander for his helpful notes; and Ross Lewin 
and Drew Britcher for providing me with vital primary sources. Special 
thanks to my mother, Peri Rosenfeld, for inspiring my curiosity in health 
policy. 
1 See Patient Safety Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.23–25 (West 
2007 & Supp. 2012). 
2 Patient Safety Reporting System, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
http://www.state.nj.us/health/ps/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(e). 
4 Id. § 26:2H-12.25(g) (rendering self-critical patient safety documents 
immune from discovery and not “admissible as evidence or otherwise 
disclosed in any civil, criminal or administrative action or proceeding”).  
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That certain medical investigations, evaluations, and peer 
review reports5 should be privileged is not a new evidentiary 
concept. At least since the early 1970s, both federal and state 
courts have relied on a self-critical analysis exception to the 
generally liberal rules of the American discovery system to 
prevent a litigant from gaining access to his adversary’s candid 
assessments of its internal practices, however relevant they 
might be to that litigant’s case.6 
In some respects, the PSA merely codified an already 
existing, judge-made, self-critical analysis privilege, which 
protected medical peer review documents. In fact, the statute 
text explicitly adopted the holding of Christy v. Salem,7 an 
important self-critical analysis case. This Note demonstrates, 
however, that while prior common law undoubtedly informed 
the drafters of the PSA, the Act actually created a fairly novel 
and more expansive self-critical analysis privilege. Quite simply, 
the values and policy concerns of the emergent “patient safety” 
movement that inspired the PSA differed from those that 
encouraged past courts to create and apply the privilege. As a 
result, these two privileges function quite differently: self-critical 
analysis under the common law (both in the federal system and 
in New Jersey) was traditionally a malleable and “qualified” 
privilege,8 applied infrequently and on an ad hoc basis by trial 
judges in an attempt to balance competing public and private 
interests during discovery. In contrast, the PSA created a more 
                                                          
5 See Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But 
No Benefit—Is It Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 7 (1999) 
(defining peer review as “a process by which members of a hospital’s 
medical staff review the qualifications, medical outcomes and professional 
conduct of other physician members and medical staff applicants to determine 
whether the reviewed physicians may practice in the hospital and, if so, to 
determine the parameters of their practice”) (citations omitted).  
6 See, e.g., Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379 
(N.D. Ga. 2001); In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 792 F. Supp. 197 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 
1970); McClain v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991 (N.J. 1985). 
7 Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
This case will be discussed in further detail in Parts II and III.  
8 See, e.g., Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 251 (holding medical peer review 
reports are “entitled to a qualified privilege”).  
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crystallized, unbending, and absolute privilege, which could 
likely produce more consistent, albeit perhaps less equitable, 
results in future litigation against hospitals. 
Under a PSA regime, trial judges will have less discretion to 
shape the course of discovery because the relevant question in 
deciding whether to apply a privilege is no longer one which 
balances the equities and considers the discoverer’s need for the 
information. Instead, courts will resolve distinctly statutory 
inquiries: whether a hospital “substantially complied” with the 
PSA’s reporting scheme9 or whether the allegedly privileged 
materials were created “exclusively” for the purpose of 
complying with the PSA.10 As a result, there is a danger that the 
PSA, while well intentioned, will spawn unintended mischief 
during litigation and may undermine the underlying goal of the 
Act—to ensure patient safety in New Jersey. 
Part I of this Note tracks the development of self-critical 
analysis doctrine in the federal courts, emphasizing the seminal 
1970 case Bredice v. Doctors Hospital.11 Part II examines the 
history of self-critical analysis in New Jersey and where it stood 
on the eve of the PSA’s passage. Part III tells the story of the 
PSA—why it was needed, how the Legislature and competing 
interest groups united behind the Act, and how the drafters 
utilized existing self-critical analysis doctrine in order to further 
their goals. Part IV shows, through the recent case of Applegrad 
ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila,12 how the PSA has unleashed some 
unforeseen results, in large part because, like with any 
controversial legislation, interested parties are now asserting 
novel interpretations of the Act. Part V argues that these 
consequences are a result of the PSA’s misguided attempt to 
apply its vision of patient safety to the incompatible common 
law principles of self-critical analysis. This Note proposes a 
more modest self-critical analysis rule, based not on the laws of 
privilege but rather on the Subsequent Remedial Measures 
                                                          
9 See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, 51 A.3d 119, 135 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
10 See id. at 139. 
11 50 F.R.D. 249. 
12 51 A.3d 119. 
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doctrine (commonly referred to as “Rule 407”13), which, in 
practice, would deem self-critical materials inadmissible at trial 
yet still discoverable. This paradigm strikes a proper balance 
between the patient’s right to uncover the truth—regardless of 
any intention to sue—and the public interest in encouraging 
constant and candid assessments of hospital procedures. 
Incidentally, this may even further the PSA’s objective of 
limiting adverse health outcomes.  
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
PRIVILEGE 
Privileges “reflect societal choices that certain relationships 
(such as those between husbands and wives) or activities (such 
as seeking legal or medical advice) should be valued above 
others.”14 Understood another way, privileges are the product of 
a principled determination by the privilege creator (typically a 
legislature or court) that the public would benefit from certain 
information remaining confidential. As one author succinctly 
stated, “[S]ociety needs privileges because in their absence, 
individuals will be discouraged from engaging in certain socially 
desirable behavior.”15 A privilege can thus be regarded as a type 
of public interest carve-out to the discovery process, which 
otherwise allows for the disclosure of all potentially relevant 
material.16  
                                                          
13 FED. R. EVID. 407.  
14 Pam Jenoff, The Case for Candor: Application of the Self-Critical 
Analysis Privilege to Corporate Diversity Initiatives, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 569, 
576 (2011). 
15 Id. at 577. For example, without an attorney-client privilege, a client 
may be reluctant to speak frankly with her lawyer, and without a doctor-
patient privilege, a patient may be reluctant to inform her physician of 
crucial, yet possibly embarrassing, details of her personal health. Society 
should (and does) encourage these behaviors, which, respectively, promote 
justice and improve health outcomes.  
16 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense . . . . Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the 
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.”). Most states have similarly expansive rules. See, e.g., N.Y. 
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While many privileges are so deeply rooted in our culture 
that few would question their necessity—the privilege against 
self-incrimination or the attorney-client privilege, for instance—
all privileges are controversial in that they prevent a party from 
uncovering facts likely crucial to its case. As Justice Scalia 
noted, “[J]ustice . . . is severely harmed by contravention of 
‘the fundamental principle that “the public has a right to every 
man’s evidence.”’”17 Privileges, the Supreme Court famously 
admonished, “are not lightly created nor expansively construed, 
for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”18 In sum, 
privileges are unabashedly bold vehicles for policymaking.19 
A. The Doctrinal Roots of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
The self-critical analysis privilege is rooted in the belief that 
in certain situations, public policy demands that institutions 
engage in evaluative internal investigations and discussions in 
order to pinpoint—and hopefully correct—recurring problems or 
prior mistakes.20 Because such discussions likely contain 
embarrassing or damaging information, participants may not 
                                                          
C.P.L.R. 3101(a) (MCKINNEY 2005) (“There shall be full disclosure of all 
matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, 
regardless of the burden of proof . . . .”). 
17 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 2192 (3d ed. 1940) (quoting Lord Hardwicke)).  
18 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
19 Because of the extraordinary power that privileges afford, and because 
they reflect overarching and often controversial policy decisions, the 
secondary question of who has the authority to create a privilege is itself an 
important public policy inquiry. Privileges in New York, for example, are 
almost entirely a product of statute. New York courts have traditionally 
declined to create new privileges. See RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE, 
RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 5-101 (11th ed. 1995) (“Efforts have been 
made to induce the courts to create privileges in favor of additional classes of 
persons, but without success.”). 
20 See, e.g., Brad Bacon, Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis: 
Encouraging Recognition of the Misunderstood Privilege, 8 KAN J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 221, 223 (1999) (“The privilege is premised on the rationale that 
unimpeded self-criticism serves a social good outweighing the cost of 
evidentiary exclusion.”).  
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speak frankly if they know their own self-critical analyses could 
be discovered by outsiders, or worse, used as evidence against 
them in a future lawsuit.21 Therefore, the argument goes, the 
contents of these discussions must remain confidential. 
The belief that a party should not be compelled to disclose 
its self-evaluative material is not novel. Such a rationale is 
embedded in two well-recognized and existing protections: (1) 
the attorney-client privilege and (2) the work-product doctrine. 
The attorney-client privilege ensures the “full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby 
promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.”22 A broad attorney-client privilege 
thus encourages a form of self-critical analysis.23 The work-
product doctrine, articulated in Hickman v. Taylor24 and now 
codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, prevents a party from discovering documents that 
were prepared in “anticipation of litigation.”25 The doctrine 
promotes the adversarial system, and more generally ensures 
fairness, by preventing a party from unjustly benefiting from the 
hard work of its adversary.26 Importantly, the work-product 
                                                          
21 See generally 1 DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., TESTIMONIAL 
PRIVILEGES § 1:120 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2012). 
22 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). In Upjohn, 
the Supreme Court recognized that robust attorney-client privilege encourages 
corporate entities to investigate and root out possible illegal activities within 
their own ranks.  
23 See, e.g., Stuart E. Rickerson, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis: 
How to Raise It and Use It, 58 DEF. COUNS. J. 504, 507 (1991) (stating that 
Upjohn “could have become the cornerstone of the critical self-examination 
privilege”). An implicit assumption in both attorney-client and self-critical 
analysis privilege is what might be called the proactive “nip it in the bud” 
approach, where reliance on forward-looking internal compliance approaches 
produces higher degrees of conformity with the law and is therefore more 
efficient and desirable than post hoc deterrents and remedies through the 
imposition of civil or criminal liability. 
24 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A). 
26 Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not 
Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 943 (1983). The doctrine serves a more 
forward-thinking goal as well: the quality of attorney work product would 
suffer if such material were easily obtainable by adversaries. See id. at 919–
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doctrine is a protection, not a privilege: a court will order 
discovery if a litigant asserts a “substantial need” for the 
materials,27 although “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, 
or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative” 
are always protected.28  
These “attorney-based protections,” however, do not extend 
to more general self-critical materials.29 Most courts have 
interpreted the “anticipation of litigation” standard of the work-
product doctrine fairly narrowly, protecting only work product 
prepared by an attorney in response to an actual event that could 
reasonably give rise to litigation.30 As one commentator noted, 
many self-critical procedures and studies are designed to prevent 
litigation and thus would “not possess the requisite tie to 
litigation to invoke work-product protection.”31 The attorney-
client privilege, on the other hand, only protects confidential 
communications between an attorney and her client.32 
Information acquired by an attorney from other sources, 
including third parties, is not protected, however “confidential” 
it may seem in the colloquial sense of the term.33 In sum, neither 
                                                          
20; see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516 (“Discovery was hardly intended to 
enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on 
wits borrowed from the adversary.”). 
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) provides that the discovering party can 
overcome the protection if it “shows that it has substantial need for the 
materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their 
substantial equivalent by other means.” 
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(3)(B). 
29 Patricia L. Andel, Inapplicability of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
to the Drug and Medical Device Industry, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 98–103 
(1997).  
30 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (“Materials 
assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public 
requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are 
not under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivision.”); see also 
Janicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C. 1982) 
(“The fact that a defendant anticipates the contingency of litigation resulting 
from an accident or an event does not automatically qualify an ‘in house’ 
report as work product.”). 
31 Andel, supra note 29, at 103. 
32 Id. at 99. 
33 Id. at 100; see also FARRELL, supra note 19, § 5-101 (quoting 7 
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the attorney-client privilege nor the work-product doctrine can 
ensure the confidentiality of self-critical materials. What is 
needed is a distinct self-critical analysis privilege.  
B. Bredice v. Doctor’s Hospital  
Bredice v. Doctors Hospital34 is often acknowledged as the 
first case in which a court recognized a common-law self-critical 
analysis privilege.35 Ms. Bredice, in her medical malpractice 
action, sought discovery of the minutes from medical board 
meetings convened by the defendant hospital concerning the 
treatment received by her late husband.36 The court observed that 
these meetings, which evaluated the performance of medical 
staff, were required by the Joint Commissions on Accreditation 
of Hospitals and existed for the “sole” purpose of improving 
care.37 The court continued: 
[T]hese meetings are essential to the continued 
improvement in the care and treatment of patients. 
Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices 
is a sine qua non of adequate hospital care. To subject 
these discussions and deliberations to the discovery 
                                                          
WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2286) (“No pledge of privacy, nor oath of 
secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a court of justice.”). 
Particularly within the context of internal compliance efforts, such as in 
Upjohn, disclosure to anyone outside the agency of the party, including to 
government agencies, may constitute a waiver of the privilege. See In re 
Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235–36 (2d Cir. 1993) (deeming company’s 
voluntary submission of materials a waiver); Andel, supra note 29, at 100. 
Further, the privilege “does not apply when the in-house attorney, who 
regularly wears several hats, is performing work that requires management 
expertise rather than work that requires legal acumen.” Andel, supra note 29, 
at 101. 
34 Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).  
35 Jenoff, supra note 14, at 580 (“[I]n Bredice, a court recognized for the 
first time that there was a strong public interest in allowing the free 
discussion of information in socially useful critical self-examination, and that 
if discovery of such materials were allowed, the flow of information would 
halt.”). 
36 Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 249. 
37 Id. at 250. 
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process, without a showing of exceptional necessity, 
would result in terminating such deliberations. 
Constructive professional criticism cannot occur in an 
atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor’s suggestion 
will be used as a denunciation of a colleague’s conduct in 
a malpractice suit.38 
The court therefore reasoned that there was an 
“overwhelming public interest” in keeping these staff meetings 
confidential “so that the flow of ideas and advice [could] 
continue unimpeded.”39 The court further noted that “what 
someone . . . at a subsequent date thought of these acts or 
omissions is not relevant to the case.”40 For both of these 
reasons, the court concluded that the meetings “are entitled to a 
qualified privilege.”41 
C. Doctrinal Disputes: How Far Should the Privilege Extend? 
Bredice predated Federal Rule of Evidence 501 (promulgated 
in 1974), which created a new framework for federal courts to 
determine when to recognize new privileges.42 While one could 
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 251. 
40 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Richards v. Me. Cent. R.R., 21 
F.R.D. 590 (D. Me. 1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This 
contention is highly questionable. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) allows for the 
discovery of materials “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.” Documents compiled in the wake of an adverse patient 
occurrence are almost certain to include relevant evidence, particularly the 
identity of witnesses, and will likely serve, in the words of James F. 
Flanagan, as a crucial “‘road map’ of the events” for the discoverer. James 
F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 558 (1983). “Any evaluation of the self-critical 
report . . . must start with the fact that it is undeniably relevant and of 
assistance in resolving the case.” Id. 
41 Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 251. 
42 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by United 
States courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of 
privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States 
Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But 
in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for 
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question whether a Bredice holding would survive under a Rule 
501 regime, many courts have since relied on Bredice to shield 
“self-critical” medical peer reviews.43 In fact, medical peer 
reports, along with internal disciplinary investigations44 and 
certain types of equal employment opportunity reports,45 
constitute the three types of documents most often afforded self-
critical analysis protection. The common denominator in all 
these cases is a court’s determination that the public interest in 
encouraging candid analysis outweighs the litigant’s right to that 
information. 
Self-critical analysis has been litigated almost entirely at the 
trial court level.46 “Rely[ing] on their inherent power to control 
discovery,”47 trial judges have applied the privilege on an ad hoc 
basis, creating what one commentator has referred to as a 
“confusing body of case law” with inconsistent results.48 The 
                                                          
which state law supplies the rule of decision.”); FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory 
committee’s note. 
43 Andel, supra note 29, at 105–06. 
44 Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 
1088 (1983) (citing, as examples, investigations conducted by railroad 
companies following an accident in order to “discipline any culpable 
employees and ultimately to improve the railroad’s safety” and police 
department investigations “when, following an arrest or shooting, a plaintiff 
has either alleged a civil rights violation or asserted a wrongful death 
claim”). 
45 Id. at 1089–90 (describing government contractors’ obligation under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to file documents that “candid[ly]” 
evaluate their own nondiscrimination procedures).  
46 See Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural 
(Il)logic of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1339, 1352 
n.74 (1992) [hereinafter Making Sense of Rules of Privilege]. 
47 Flanagan, supra note 40, at 575. 
48 GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:119. Adding to the confusion, 
federal courts often treat privileges as matters of “substance” (rather than 
procedure) under an Erie analysis and therefore defer to the privilege law in 
the state in which they sit. See, e.g., Lawson v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 191 
F.R.D. 381, 382 (D. Vt. 1999) (“[T]his Court applies state law in 
determining whether a privilege for self-critical analysis exists.”); see also 
Spencer Sav. Bank, SLA v. Excell Mortg. Corp., 960 F. Supp. 835, 836 
(D.N.J. 1997) (“[A] federal court may ‘resort to state law analogies for the 
development of a federal common law of privileges in instances where the 
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deferential “abuse of discretion” standard governing appeals of 
trial court discovery rulings,49 as well as parties’ inability in 
many jurisdictions to appeal discovery rulings until a “final” 
judgment, have resulted in a dearth of guidance from appellate 
courts, which, in turn, has created more unpredictability.50 As a 
result, “some jurisdictions have cases with conflicting outcomes 
that are barely recognizable.”51 Many courts have also simply 
rejected the privilege outright.52 
The privilege’s lack of coherence has forced observers to 
grapple with the basic question of whether the self-critical 
analysis should be an “absolute” relational privilege of the 
attorney-client or doctor-patient type or rather an equitable tool 
of trial judges to ensure fairness during discovery and thus more 
similar to protections like the work-product doctrine. Despite the 
inconsistent application of the privilege, one influential Harvard 
Law Review Note discerned three overarching principles to the 
application of the privilege in certain scenarios. First, the 
privilege seeks to prevent the “dual chilling effect” discovery 
would unleash: “the direct chilling effect on the institutional or 
individual self-analyst . . . [which] operates to discourage the 
analyst from investigating thoroughly and frankly or even from 
investigating at all,”53 as well as the chilling effect upon the 
data-“supplier,” which “discourage[s] individuals from coming 
                                                          
federal rule is unsettled.’” (quoting Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition 
Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1982))). 
49 See, e.g., Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 425 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
50 See GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:119. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. (“The privilege is defined differently in different jurisdictions, but 
in most cases the courts have found that the privilege did not apply to facts 
before them.”). 
53 The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 44, at 1091–92.  
Fear of lawsuits, however, is not the only cause for hesitancy on the 
part of self-analysts. If an individual self-analyst is asked by his 
superiors to conduct an internal analysis, the individual may temper 
his criticism out of a fear that reprisals will result if the analysis 
ultimately leads to liability or adverse publicity for the employer.  
Id. at 1092. 
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forward with relevant information.”54 The second principle is 
that evaluations and opinions in self-critical materials are 
protected from discovery but the underlying facts upon which 
these opinions are based are not,55 a distinction which the Note 
criticized, observing that “chilling effects of disclosure often 
operate on facts as well as evaluations.”56 The third principle is 
that the privilege is not “absolute,” meaning it is applied on a 
case-by-case basis, and, even when applied, may be overcome if 
a party shows “exceptional need” for the material.57 The Note 
likewise criticized this principle, advocating for a more 
absolutist privilege approach, analogous to the attorney-client 
context, in which judges decline to “weight the equities” in 
determining whether to apply the self-critical analysis privilege.58 
For much the same reason, the Note criticized the “exceptional 
need” concession: “The more crucial the material is to the 
[discoverer’s] case, the more likely it is to be the type of 
material that the privilege was designed to protect.”59 The Note 
therefore criticized courts for “fail[ing] to give the privilege 
sufficiently broad application to effectuate the important policies 
underlying it.”60  
In contrast, James F. Flanagan, in Rejecting a General 
Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, asserted that self-critical 
analysis is not an “evidentiary privilege” and should instead be 
regarded as “an exercise in discretionary protection founded in 
the court’s power over discovery.”61 Self-critical analysis is thus 
                                                          
54 Id. at 1092. “Without the privilege, as the risk of liability for the 
institution increases, the likelihood that witnesses will come forward 
decreases.” Id.  
55 Id. at 1093–94. This same distinction exists in work-product doctrine. 
See FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (protecting “mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories”); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947) 
(recognizing that thoughts are “inviolate” and “outside the arena of 
discovery”). 
56 The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 44, at 1095. 
57 Id. at 1096–97.  
58 Id. at 1098. 
59 Id. at 1099.  
60 Id. at 1100. 
61 Flanagan, supra note 40, at 576. 
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similar to the work-product doctrine, which protects certain 
materials from discovery absent a showing of “sufficient 
need.”62 Flanagan concedes that protecting medical peer reviews 
from malpractice plaintiffs is necessary, recognizing that “a 
failure to ensure [their] confidentiality will diminish the[ir] 
quality.”63 Yet he also observes that many states nevertheless 
protect these reports in the form of “peer review statutes,” 
which, unlike a general self-critical analysis rule, “provide 
sufficient exceptions so that no litigant will be seriously 
prejudiced because he cannot discover who was present or what 
occurred during a relevant review proceeding.”64 Flanagan thus 
concludes that while self-critical analysis may be a worthwhile 
public policy, it is undeserving of an unqualified privilege.65 
D. The Current State of Self-Critical Analysis  
While the self-critical analysis doctrine has likely informed 
many medical peer-review statutes,66 it has certainly not gained 
recognition as a general privilege. Instead, the privilege has 
been maintained as an equitable tool for trial courts to shield 
documents not otherwise protected by the attorney-client 
privilege or work-product doctrine.67 There is little agreement 
                                                          
62 Id. at 575. 
63 Id. at 576.  
64 Id. at 577. As discussed infra Parts II & III, New Jersey is one of the 
few states in which medical peer-review protections are not derived from 
statute, but rather from decisional law (the exception being the “utilization 
review” privilege, see infra Parts II & III).  
65 Flanagan, supra note 40, at 582 (“At best there are compelling reasons 
for courts to consider requests for discovery of peer reviews, to weigh 
alternatives, and to seek the least harmful means of disclosure.”). 
66 GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:121 (“State law relating to 
privileges is often governed by statute, and many states have statutes adopting 
forms of a self-evaluative privilege in a very limited context. For example, 
most states afford some confidentiality to medical peer reviews of patient 
care.”).  
67 Id. (observing that “in order to provide additional protection [aside 
from the attorney-client and work-product protections], some courts have 
recognized [the self-critical analysis privilege] to protect institutional self-
analysis from outside discovery”). 
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even in those three areas where courts typically apply the 
privilege.68 For example, one court observed that employment 
discrimination cases “are all over the map on whether the self-
evaluative privilege exists,” noting that “[t]he privilege is a 
creature of the state trial courts, and there is little uniformity of 
law even within particular states.”69 Even courts recognizing a 
self-critical analysis privilege have mostly found it did not apply 
in the cases before them.70  
The Supreme Court’s decision in University of Pennsylvania 
v. EEOC,71 which declined to recognize a peer-review privilege, 
was a discernible setback for the self-critical analysis movement. 
The University of Pennsylvania, defendant in a Title VII 
discrimination suit, refused to turn over tenure review files, 
arguing that courts should embrace a “common law” peer 
review privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.72 The 
Court held that “although Rule 501 manifests a congressional 
desire . . . [to] provide the courts with flexibility to develop 
rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis . . . we are disinclined 
to exercise this authority expansively.”73 The University’s peer 
review claim was, at its core, one of self-critical analysis. Both 
privileges posit that society should encourage the frank 
evaluations of experts in a given field on matters of public 
import, even at the expense of denying individual litigants access 
to plainly relevant materials.74 The Court’s rebuff of the 
University’s policy rationale thus foreclosed a similar self-
critical analysis defense in the future. As such, subsequent 
                                                          
68 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
69 Walker v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 227 F.R.D. 529, 532 (N.D. Cal. 
2005); see also Siskonen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610, 611 (W.D. 
Mich. 1989) (observing self-critical analysis law in federal discrimination 
cases to be “in disarray”). 
70 See GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:119. 
71 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
72 Id. at 188–89. 
73 Id. at 189 (citations omitted). 
74 See, e.g., Making Sense of Rules of Privilege, supra note 46, at 1352 
n.75 (observing that the academic peer review privilege “center[s] upon many 
of the same normative and empirical arguments that dominate the self-critical 
analysis privilege area”).  
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courts have relied on University of Pennsylvania to reject a self-
critical analysis privilege.75 
Today, many courts rely on the four-part test articulated by 
the Ninth Circuit in Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises,76 
which held that a party asserting the privilege must show that:  
“[1] the information must result from a critical self-
analysis undertaken by the party seeking protection; [2] 
the public must have a strong interest in preserving the 
free flow of the type of information sought; [3] the 
information must be of the type whose flow would be 
curtailed if discovery were allowed.” . . . [And 4, that 
the document] was prepared with the expectation that it 
would be kept confidential, and has in fact been kept 
confidential.77  
In Dowling, the court allowed the plaintiff, in his personal 
injury action under the Jones Act,78 to discover the factual 
content of the defendant cruise ship’s preaccident safety 
committee meeting minutes, reasoning that “organizations have 
many incentives to conduct such reviews that outweigh the harm 
that might result from disclosure,” such as fear of other lawsuits 
or simply “to avoid developing a reputation for having an unsafe 
premises.”79 
Altogether, the federal courts have generally declined to 
extend application of the self-critical analysis doctrine.80 Despite 
                                                          
75 Jenoff, supra note 14, at 585 (observing that the majority of lower 
courts have “seemed to take University of Pennsylvania as a broad mandate 
to reject the self-critical analysis privilege” in the employment context). 
76 Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992). 
77 Id. at 426 (citations omitted) (quoting The Privilege of Self-Critical 
Analysis, supra note 44, at 1086). 
78 The Jones Act, also known as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 
empowers injured seamen with a tort remedy. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2011) (“A 
seaman injured in the course of employment . . . may elect to bring a civil 
action at law . . . .”). 
79 Dowling, 971 F.2d at 426. Remanding the case, the court did not 
explicitly rule on whether opinions and conclusions would still be protected. 
Id. at 427. 
80 See GREENWALD ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:119. 
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the best efforts of the defendants’ bar and corporate counsel,81 
the dream of a broad and impenetrable general privilege, as 
articulated in the Harvard Note, has not been realized. 
II. SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS IN NEW JERSEY 
Because the Patient Safety Act referred by name to self-
critical analysis, and because the statute itself explicitly 
incorporated the holding of Christy v. Salem,82 an important self-
critical analysis case which itself was the culmination of two 
decades of common law development, it is crucial to understand 
the status of the doctrine in New Jersey prior to passage of the 
PSA. New Jersey courts, much like the federal courts, have 
approached the privilege with caution, recognizing it only in 
limited situations. 
A. The Lead-Up to Christy 
Christy represents a synthesis of two separate streams of case 
law—those that confront the self-critical analysis privilege within 
the context of medical peer reviews, and those that deal with the 
privilege more generally. The most important case, Payton v. 
New Jersey Turnpike Authority,83 was the latter type. Christy 
could be understood as an application of Payton in the medical 
context. To appreciate the relevance of Christy, a very brief 
                                                          
81 For example, the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, a 
trade group “dedicated to representation of insurers and corporations,” FED’N 
DEF. & CORP. COUNS., http://www.thefederation.org/ (last visited Feb. 21, 
2013), recently published an article in their quarterly journal advocating for 
formal adoption of the privilege, Kurtis B. Reeg & Mathew A. Temper, The 
Self-Critical Analysis Privilege: It Is Time for Formal Adoption, 62 FED’N 
DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 80 (2011). 
82 The statute provides that “[n]othing in this act shall be construed to 
increase or decrease the discoverability, in accordance with Christy . . . of 
any documents, materials or information if obtained from any source or 
context other than those specified in this act.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-
12.25(k) (West 2007) (citation omitted). For much more on this, see infra 
Part III. 
83 Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1997). 
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historical sketch of self-critical analysis in New Jersey is in 
order.  
The first case to grapple with the privilege was Wylie v. 
Mills,84 a lawsuit arising out of an automobile accident, where a 
defendant utility company sought protection of a document titled 
“[City of] Elizabeth Electric Transmission & Distribution 
Committee Investigation—Automobile Accident,” which 
purported to “determine whether [the defendant] should alter its 
procedures to avoid future injuries to employees.”85 While the 
court summarily rejected the defendant’s contention that the 
document was protected under a work-product or attorney-client 
privilege, it found defendant’s assertion of the “nascent” self-
critical analysis protection to be a “more formidable and 
persuasive argument.”86 Citing Bredice, the court determined 
that “confidentiality and the ‘public need for confidentiality’ are 
the sine qua non of effective internal self-critical analysis”87 and 
protected the evaluative portions of the report while ordering 
disclosure of the factual portions. 
One year later, in 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in 
McClain v. College Hospital, expounded upon Wylie’s 
discussion of the privilege.88 Within the context of medical peer 
reviews, the court ruled that the plaintiff/discoverer must show  
particularized need that outweighs the public interest in 
confidentiality of the investigative proceedings, taking 
into account (1) the extent to which the information may 
be available from other sources, (2) the degree of harm 
that the litigant will suffer from its unavailability, and (3) 
the possible prejudice to the agency’s investigation.89 
                                                          
84 Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). A 
Westlaw search reveals this to be the first New Jersey case in which a court 
either used the phrase “self-critical analysis” or cited Bredice. 
85 Id. at 1275. 
86 Id. at 1276. 
87 Id. at 1277. 
88 McClain v. Coll. Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 997–98 (N.J. 1985). 
89 Id. at 993. 
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Guided by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
EPA v. Mink,90 which held that factual material could be 
“severed” and thus disclosed from otherwise privileged 
documents, the court remanded the case and ordered an in 
camera inspection of the documents, holding that “strictly 
factual” contents be disclosed but that “matters of opinion or 
conjecture” be entitled to a “higher degree of protection.”91  
In Bundy v. Sinopoli,92 the court noted that the legislature 
created a privilege for a hospital’s “utilization review 
committee” reports93 and also provided broad immunity for 
participants’ statements made during the peer review process94 
yet also observed that “[t]he Legislature has not . . . provided 
for a privilege regarding the information contained within the 
Peer Review process.”95 The court nonetheless held the 
evaluations therein were “absolutely protected” under the 
“common law” self-critical analysis doctrine enunciated under 
Wylie and McClain.96 
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Payton scaled 
back Wylie’s and Bundy’s broad interpretation of the privilege. 
Payton, in the course of her sexual harassment suit, sought to 
discover the minutes of the “executive session” her employer 
convened in response to allegations of harassment.97 The court 
was confronted with two competing public interests, both of 
which further the same goal of limiting incidents of sexual 
harassment: “disclosure to ensure that employers maintain 
effective sexual-harassment procedures and nondisclosure to 
                                                          
90 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). 
91 McClain, 492 A.2d at 1000. 
92 Bundy v. Sinopoli, 580 A.2d 1101 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990). 
93 These documents, resulting from peer review, are created as a 
condition of receiving federal funding under the Social Security Act. See id. 
at 1104. The privilege is embodied in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.8 (West 
2011). 
94 Bundy, 580 A.2d at 1106. This immunity protects participants from 
defamation claims. See, e.g., Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 520 A.2d 1154 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).  
95 Bundy, 580 A.2d at 1105. 
96 Id. at 1106. 
97 Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 325 (N.J. 1997). 
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enable employers to maintain effective procedures that 
encourage reporting and candid statements by all involved.”98 
The court concluded that self-critical analysis was “not 
qualitatively different from other confidential information, and 
thus [did] not require the protection of a broad privilege.”99 
Payton therefore clarified that self-critical analysis was, at most, 
an occasional bulwark against discovery.100 
B. Christy v. Salem 
On February 17, 2004, the Appellate Division decided 
Christy v. Salem.101 In Christy, the plaintiff, in his medical 
malpractice action, sought the defendant hospital’s peer review 
report after learning that an x-ray material to his claims went 
missing and following the depositions of several physicians 
which “resulted in [alleged] discrepancies . . . concerning [how] 
events unfolded at the hospital.”102 The court noted that the 
“conditional” privilege established in Payton empowered trial 
courts to protect confidentiality “short of suppression” through 
techniques such as “redaction, issuance of confidentiality or gag 
orders, and sealing of portions of the record.”103 The court 
recognized that “here, unlike Payton [which implicated the 
‘public interest’ of preventing sexual harassment], we are 
required to balance the private interest of a patient against the 
public interest of a hospital”104 and concluded that “plaintiff’s 
interest in disclosure does not the have the ‘strong . . . 
reflection of important public policies, to outweigh . . . 
                                                          
98 Id. at 329. 
99 Id. at 331.  
100 Id. 
101 Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
Christy was decided following the January 26, 2004 hearings before the New 
Jersey Senate Heath, Human Services and Senior Citizens Committee on the 
proposed PSA legislation, but prior to the March 4, 2004 committee hearings 
in the General Assembly. See infra Part III.  
102 Christy, 841 A.2d at 938. 
103 Id. at 940 (quoting Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 330 
(N.J. 1997)). 
104 Id.  
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confidentiality concerns under most, if not all, 
circumstances.’”105 On the other hand, the court cited a section 
from the New Jersey statute commonly referred to as the 
“Patient Bill of Rights”106 as support for the proposition that 
patients have a “right to know . . . what happened to them while 
in a hospital.”107  
Defendants and amicus curiae New Jersey Hospital 
Association (“NJHA”) argued that if the court allowed 
disclosure of factual materials, it would lead hospitals to simply 
exclude them in future peer review documents.108 The court 
rejected this contention as “contrary to the reasoning in both 
McClain and Payton,”109 questioning whether facts, which 
“provide the basis” for self-critical analysis, would be excluded 
“simply because [they are] discoverable.”110 Defendants also 
argued that plaintiff in any event failed to show a “compelling 
need” for the reports, to which the court responded that “[t]he 
availability of relevant facts from multiple sources has never in 
and of itself prevented discovery . . . . It is not unusual to find 
subtle differences in both testimony and documented facts, 
which support an argument bearing on credibility.”111 The court 
therefore held that the plaintiff need not make a showing of 
compelling need to access the factual material of the documents 
and ordered their disclosure. The court even ordered disclosure 
of a so-called “deliberative” portion concerning the inability of 
the committee to reach a resolution on an issue due to “missing 
information” because the court believed it could reasonably lead 
to discovery.112 
                                                          
105 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Payton, 691 A.2d at 333). 
106 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8(c) (West 2007) (empowering a 
patient with the right “[t]o obtain from the physician complete, current 
information concerning his diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis in terms he 
can reasonably be expected to understand”).  
107 Christy, 841 A.2d at 940. 
108 Id. at 939. 
109 Id. at 941. 
110 Id. at 942. 
111 Id. at 941–42. 
112 Id. “We are convinced that [defendants] would not be prejudiced by 
disclosure, notwithstanding its deliberative nature, because the peer review 
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Nonetheless, the court refused to allow discovery of the 
committee’s opinions and fact-findings. First, the court felt that 
the plaintiff did not demonstrate a compelling need for 
disclosure because he already “obtained and supplied opinions 
from three separate experts supporting his claim of medical 
malpractice.”113 Second, the court noted that justifications for 
disclosure were based on allegations of the factual discrepancies, 
and having inspected the documents in camera, the court was 
“convinced” that by allowing disclosure of the other material, 
“[the] plaintiff’s compelling needs [had] been addressed.”114 The 
court further ruled that the committee’s factual findings were “of 
no use to plaintiff, as such findings are within the sole province 
of the jury” and that “disclosure might discourage a peer review 
committee from making factual findings because such findings 
often include a determination of what is credible.”115 
Because the PSA explicitly referenced (without comment) the 
holding in Christy, it is worth asking: what was the holding? On 
a basic level, it reaffirmed two basic and interrelated principles 
of self-critical analysis: first, that facts are generally 
discoverable; and second, that privileged material can 
nonetheless be discovered upon a showing of “substantial” or 
“compelling” need. In short, the privilege is qualified.116 
Nonetheless, it is possible that Christy did not have any 
discernible holding but was instead a series of fact-sensitive 
rulings—a good faith attempt to balance the competing interests 
and equities of rival discovery claims. The Christy court 
happened to conclude that the plaintiff demonstrated a 
compelling need to discover factual materials. One cannot be 
sure that the Christy court would reach the same conclusion in 
only slightly different circumstances. For example, the plaintiff 
in Christy was denied discovery of the evaluative materials 
                                                          
committee has itself been unable to resolve the issue due to the missing 
information, the possible whereabouts of which is described in the subject 
sentence.” Id. at 942. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 942–43. 
116 The references to Christy during the Senate hearings seem to 
subscribe to this reading. See infra Part III. 
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because the court was “convinced” that his compelling needs 
were addressed through disclosure of the factual documents. 
How would the court rule if, next time, it was “convinced” that 
the evaluations, and not the factual material, were more likely to 
meet a plaintiff’s needs? Christy should have even less 
precedential value considering that the documents at issue were 
confidential, inspected in camera, and without description in the 
decision. One must therefore consider the possibility that Christy 
was simply an application of existing self-critical analysis 
doctrine, specifically the McClain and Payton rules. Perhaps the 
court never intended to make new law.117 
III. THE PATIENT SAFETY ACT 
A. The Patient Safety Movement 
The PSA is New Jersey’s response to the relatively recent 
healthcare discipline known as “patient safety,” which examines 
the institutional problems in complex healthcare systems that 
cause medical errors.118 The discipline stresses that the vigilant 
                                                          
117 Judge Raymond A. Reddin, the trial Judge in Applegrad ex rel. C.A. 
v. Bentolilia, see infra Part IV, raised a related point during oral arguments: 
Cases are not firmly rooted in cement. They change. They are 
modified . . . . So, what happens to this Patient Safety Act if the 
Supreme Court either expands Christy, reduces the scope of Christy, 
overrules Christy? Does not the legislature then have to say, we read 
what the Supreme court did in this decision and notwithstanding that, 
okay, forget what we said about Christy, now we say the holding in 
whatever this new case is doesn’t change anything? . . . . [D]id not 
the legislature posit the Patient Safety Act on something that isn’t 
strong footed? I mean, did they anchor the boat to something that 
may not be there tomorrow?  
Stenographic Transcript of Proceeding Hearings, September 7, 2011, at 14–
16, Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, No. PAS-L-908-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. Sept. 26, 2011).  
118 See Linda Emanuel et al., What Exactly Is Patient Safety?, in 1 
ADVANCES IN PATIENT SAFETY: NEW DIRECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACHES 4 (Kerm Henriksen et al. eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/advances2/vol1/Advances-Emanuel-
Berwick_110.pdf (defining patient safety both as “a discipline in the health 
care sector that applies safety science methods toward the goal of achieving a 
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patrolling, reporting, and analysis of healthcare phenomena— 
particularly adverse incidents (such as the event giving rise to 
the peer review in Bredice) and so-called “near misses”—will 
allow providers and policymakers to locate, and ultimately fix, 
the mechanisms that allowed for the error in the first place.119  
The 1999 Institute of Medicine Report, To Err is Human: 
Building a Safer Health System, which alarmingly estimated that 
between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans died each year as a result 
of preventable medical errors,120 effectively launched the Patient 
Safety Movement in America.121 Within months of publication, 
President Clinton called for the creation of nationwide error-
reporting systems and mandated the introduction of patient safety 
programs for hospitals participating in Medicare.122 Federal and 
state agencies, hospitals, and other health providers followed 
suit, initiating mandatory reporting systems, improved health 
records systems, and other policies attempting to root out errors 
in medicine.123 In 2005, Congress passed the Patient Safety and 
Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (“PSQIA”),124 which created 
Patient Safety Organizations (“PSOs”) “to collect, aggregate, 
and analyze confidential information reported by health care 
providers” on a privileged and confidential basis, for analysis of 
                                                          
trustworthy system of health care delivery” and as “an attribute of health care 
systems; it minimizes the incidence and impact of, and maximizes recovery 
from, adverse events”). 
119 See id. at 2, 5–6; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(d) (West 
2007 & Supp. 2012); George J. Annas, The Patient’s Right to Safety—
Improving the Quality of Care Through Litigation Against Hospitals, 354 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2063, 2065 (2006). 
120 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER 
HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (2000). 
121 See Bob Wachter, The Patient Safety Movement Turns Ten, HEALTH 
CARE BLOG (Dec. 2, 2009), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2009/12/02/ 
the-patient-safety-movement-turns-ten/.  
122 Fred Charatan, Clinton Acts to Reduce Medical Mistakes, 320 BRIT. 
MED. J. 597, 597 (2000). 
123 See generally Lucian Leape & Don Berwick, Five Years After To Err 
Is Human: What Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384 (2005). 
124 The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
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patient safety events.125 New Jersey sought to create a similar 
patient safety regime.  
B. The New Jersey Patient Safety Act 
The New Jersey Patient Safety Act was, in part, a response 
to revelations that a New Jersey nurse named Charles Cullen 
had administered lethal doses of medication to over forty 
patients under his care over a several-year period at roughly a 
dozen different facilities.126 The PSA’s drafters believed that a 
more robust centralized reporting system could have sooner 
uncovered Mr. Cullen’s crimes.127 
The portion of the Act entitled “Findings, declarations 
relative to patient safety” accurately summed up some basic 
tenets of the patient safety movement.128 Readers should take 
                                                          
125 The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, AGENCY 
FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY (June 2008), http://www.ahrq.gov/ 
qual/psoact.htm. The agency specifically cites the Institute of Medicine 
Report as the impetus for the bill. 
126 Senator Joseph F. Vitale, Chairman of the Senate Health and Human 
Services and Senior Citizens Committee, remarked during committee hearings 
that “this [bill] is, in part, due to the recent revelations of Charles Cullen, 
who has professed to have killed at least 40 individuals under his care.” 
Testimony on the Patient Safety Act: Hearing on S.B. 557 Before the S. 
Comm. on Health, Human Servs. & Senior Citizens, 211th Leg., 2004–2005 
Sess., at 2 (N.J. 2004) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]. In 2006, Cullen pleaded 
guilty to twenty-nine counts of murder and six counts of attempted murder in 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania courts. Sophie Sohn & Allan Chernoff, Killer 
Nurse Gets 11 Life Sentences, CNN JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2006, 11:11 AM), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2006-03-02/justice/killer.nurse_1_cullen-names-killer-
nurse-john-shanagher?_s=PM:LAW.  
127 See Senate Hearing, supra note 126, at 31 (testimony of U.S. Senator 
Frank Lautenberg’s Office) (commending the committee “for convening this 
important hearing to discuss recommendations to improve the integrity and 
safety of our health-care system in the wake of the tragic murders carried out 
by Charles Cullen”); id. at 41 (testimony of David Knowlton, Chairman, 
New Jersey Health Care Quality Institute) (“[I]n the Cullen case, there were 
people who had concerns, but they—if they’re a nurse, they [first] have to 
report it to a supervisor. . . . [T]he new bill that you’ve just approved . . . 
would provide immunity.”). 
128 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
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special note of subsection (e), as it seems to address medical 
malpractice litigation: 
The Legislature finds and declares that:  
a. Adverse events, some of which are the result of 
preventable errors, are inherent in all systems, and . . . 
the great majority of medical errors result from systems 
problems, not individual incompetence; . . . 
e. To encourage disclosure of these events so that they 
can be analyzed and used for improvement, it is critical 
to create a non-punitive culture that focuses on improving 
processes rather than assigning blame. Health care 
facilities and professionals must be held accountable for 
serious preventable adverse events; however, punitive 
environments are not particularly effective in promoting 
accountability and increasing patient safety, and may be a 
deterrent to the exchange of information required to 
reduce the opportunity for errors to occur in the complex 
systems of care delivery. Fear of sanctions induces health 
care professionals and organizations to be silent about 
adverse events, resulting in serious under-reporting; and  
f. By establishing an environment that both mandates the 
confidential disclosure of the most serious, preventable 
adverse events, and also encourages the voluntary, 
anonymous and confidential disclosure of less serious 
adverse events, as well as preventable events and near 
misses, the State seeks to increase the amount of 
information on systems failures, analyze the sources of 
these failures and disseminate information on effective 
practices for reducing systems failures and improving the 
safety of patients.129 
To further these legislative goals, the Act mandated 
healthcare facilities to report every “serious preventable adverse 
event” to the Department of Health and Senior Services130 and to 
                                                          
129 Id. 
130 Id. § 26:2H-12.25(c). 
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notify patients of such occurrences “in a timely fashion.”131 
Crucially, the Act provided that: 
Any documents, materials or information developed by a 
health care facility as part of a process of self-critical 
analysis conducted pursuant to subsection b. of this 
section . . . shall not be . . . subject to discovery or 
admissible as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any 
civil, criminal or administrative action or 
proceeding . . . .132 
As indicated earlier, the Appellate Division decided Christy 
while the Patient Safety bill was already in the midst of 
discussions at the committee level. The drafters of the PSA 
added subsection (k), in an attempt to clarify the new privilege it 
had just created: “Nothing in this act shall be construed to 
increase or decrease the discoverability, in accordance with 
Christy v. Salem . . . of any documents, materials or 
information if obtained from any source or context other than 
those specified in this act.”133  
This late addition of subsection (k) was the product of 
extensive negotiations with Senate and Assembly members and 
representatives from both NJHA and the Association of Trial 
Lawyers of America—New Jersey (“ATLA-NJ”) immediately 
prior to the Assembly hearing.134 Evidently, and somewhat 
                                                          
131 Id. § 26:2H-12.25(d). 
132 Id. § 26:2H-12.25(g) (emphasis added). 
133 Id. § 26:2H-12.25(k). 
134 Drew Britcher, in the NJAJ amicus brief in Applegrad noted that: 
[O]n the day that the General Assembly Health Committee was to 
entertain the bill, the hearing of testimony regarding the bill was 
held until certain amendments, namely the provision concerning 
Christy . . . were presented with the assistance of the Office of 
Legislative Services. Indeed, the discussions concerning the inclusion 
of a specific case reference were so lengthy that they warranted a 
comment by the Assembly Health Committee Chairperson, the 
Honorable Loretta Weinberg that “we just completed the longest 
recess in the history of committee meetings.” 
Brief on Behalf of New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ) at 3, Applegrad 
ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, No. PAS-L-908-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
Sept. 26, 2011).  
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surprisingly, both NJHA and ATLA-NJ found Christy’s holding 
acceptable and lobbied for its inclusion in the PSA before 
agreeing to publicly support the legislation. All sides professed 
satisfaction. Elizabeth Ryan, General Counsel of NJHA, 
referring to the bill as “landmark legislation,” thanked the 
committee for “preserving” Christy, a case “very important to 
the provider community.”135 Drew Britcher of ATLA-NJ 
likewise applauded Christy’s codification.136 
That the PSA secured the endorsement of two oft-adverse 
interest groups was not lost on the bill’s drafters. Sitting 
between Ms. Ryan and Mr. Britcher, sponsor Senator Joseph 
Vitale proclaimed that “we’re here together in accord over this 
bill.”137 Clifton Lacy, Commissioner of the Department of 
Health and Senior Services, emphasized the need for additional 
protections, citing to a National Association of State Health 
Policy report indicating that, of the twenty-one states with 
legislation mandating the reporting of medical errors, New 
Jersey was alone in not also legislating a peer-review 
privilege.138 Commissioner Lacy asserted that “the focus on 
finding who did wrong rather than why things go wrong is the 
major obstacle in improving safety across this country,”139 and 
commended the bill for “shield[ing] self-critical analysis from 
discovery but maintain[ing as] discoverable all that is now 
discoverable.”140 The PSA passed both houses soon thereafter, 
was signed into law by Governor Jim McGreevey on April 27, 
2004, and went into effect on October 24 of that year.141 
                                                          
135 Legislative Hearing on Patient Safety Act Before the Gen. Assemb. 
Comm. on Health, Human Servs. & Senior Citizens, 211th Leg., 2004–2005 
Sess., at 7 (N.J. 2004) [hereinafter Assembly Hearing]. 
136 See id. at 22–23 (praising the “preservation of the discoverability . . . 
reconfirmed recently by our courts,” which “draw[s] an important balance 
between the absolutely vital aspect of trying to identify medical error . . . 
while at the same time recognizing . . . [that] the patient does need to know 
what has happened to them”). 
137 Id. at 2. 
138 Id. at 19–20. 
139 Id. at 15. 
140 Id. at 19. 
141 See Press Release, N.J. Gov. Jim McGreevey, McGreevey Signs 
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IV. DUELING INTERPRETATIONS, UNINTENDED MISCHIEF 
A. Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila 
Despite the good feelings on all sides surrounding the 
passage of the statute, a glaring inconsistency existed in the 
PSA: subsection (g) provided—without exception or ambiguity—
that the materials developed as a process of self-critical analysis 
“shall not be subject to discovery or admissible as evidence,” 
while subsection (k) codified Christy, which provided for the 
disclosure of certain self-critical materials. The Appellate 
Division was confronted with this dilemma in Appelgrad ex rel. 
C.A. v. Bentolila, where plaintiffs Esther and Gedalia 
Applegrad, on behalf of their infant child “C.A.,” alleged 
medical malpractice against Valley Hospital (“Valley”) for the 
brain damage and oxygen deprivation sustained by C.A. during 
delivery.142 During discovery, Valley withheld six documents, 
which it asserted were absolutely privileged.143 The motion judge 
sided with Valley, ruling that the PSA was a “legislative 
overruling” of Christy and that the materials were fully 
protected from disclosure.144  
On appeal, the Appellate Division noted that “[a]lthough not 
specifically mentioned in Christy, several regulatory and 
professional standards existed before . . . adoption of the PSA 
                                                          
Landmark Law Protecting NJ’s Families (Apr. 27, 2004), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20041116163012/http://www.state.nj.us/cgi-bin/ 
governor/njnewsline/view_article_archives.pl?id=1884; Medical Errors and 
Patient Safety – New Jersey, QUALITY & PATIENT SAFETY, http://qups.org/ 
med_errors.php?c=individual_state&s=31&t=1 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
142 Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad I), No. L-0908-08, 
2011 WL 13700, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 5, 2011). 
143 Id. at *2. Valley identified those documents: “Occurrence Report; 
Director of Patient Safety Post Incident Analysis; Department of Risk 
Management Request for Quality Assurance Review; Mother/Baby Quality 
Assurance/Performance Improvement Review; Department of OB/GYN Quality 
Assurance Response; and Utilization Review Committee, Quality Assessment 
and Improvement Subcommittee of the Department of OB/GYN.” Id.  
144 Id. at *4. Initially, the judge ordered disclosure of two documents but 
changed course following an ex parte meeting with defense counsel, who for 
the first time asserted privilege under the PSA. Id.  
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. . . that pertain to the activities of hospitals in engaging in 
forms of internal self-assessments and reporting[,] some or all 
. . . apparently continu[ing] to this day.”145 The question, 
therefore, was, how did the PSA alter existing law? 
Valley and amicus NJHA argued that the PSA represented a 
“sweeping change in the law of privilege, . . . insulat[ing] from 
disclosure a wide range of documents and information that 
previously may have been subject to disclosure.”146 On that 
view, subsection (k) simply clarified that documents not 
produced pursuant to the PSA would still be subject to a Christy 
analysis and remain partially discoverable.147 Plaintiffs and 
amicus New Jersey Association for Justice (formerly ATLA-
NJ)148 argued that “Christy’s factual/evaluative distinction still 
applies to documents generated under the PSA”149 and that, at 
any rate, the privilege should not apply because there was no 
proof that Valley actually reported the Applegrad event to state 
officials pursuant to the Act.150 
Nonetheless, the court eschewed answering any of these 
“interpretative issues” due to what it felt were “especially 
troublesome” “uncertainties” in the record regarding why and 
how these withheld documents actually came into being151: 
                                                          
145 Id. at *7. For example, the court observed that the Legislature 
directed hospitals to develop “peer review quality assurance processes” but 
pointedly did not provide that such documents be privileged. Also, hospitals, 
in accordance with guidelines established by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, had already engaged in “self-
critical analysis procedures” to determine the “root cause” of adverse 
occurrences. Id. at *6. 
146 Id. at *8. It is worth remembering that NJHA supported the Patient 
Safety bill because of, not in spite of, the “preservation” of Christy. See 
supra Part III. 
147 Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8. NJHA specifically cited the 
preservation of Christy as grounds for supporting the PSA at the General 
Assembly hearing. See supra Part III. 
148 NJAJ was represented by Drew Britcher, former president of ATLA-
NJ, who testified at the General Assembly hearing. See supra Part III.  
149 Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at *8, *9. 
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One of the documents . . . bears a heading of 
“Occurrence Report,” with no further explanatory label 
or statutory cross-reference. Another one . . . contains a 
boxed legend on its first page citing the PSA, stating that 
“This Quality Assurance Document was created and is 
protected in accordance with N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.23 et 
seq.” Two of the documents . . . bear a different heading 
with no statutory citation: “CONFIDENTIAL  
RISK MANAGEMENT / QUALITY ASSURANCE 
DOCUMENT.” Another document . . . contains no label 
and is on business letterhead. Lastly, the document dated 
September 10, 2007 bears this heading: 
“CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED Pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A[-]22.8,” the utilization review 
statute.152 
The court exclaimed that “mere labeling of a hospital 
document does not necessarily control its legal classification.”153 
The court also noted Valley’s inability to explain how self-
critical “organizational structures and processes” actually 
changed in the wake of the PSA’s enactment.154 The court 
therefore remanded the case, directing Valley to explain in 
greater detail “the internal processes within the hospital that 
generated each document, and how those processes relate to . . . 
other standards apart from the PSA.”155 
Finally, and most curiously, the court suggested in a footnote 
that the PSA’s “restriction on evidential admissibility in the 
courts” may have improperly limited the judiciary’s powers in 
violation of the New Jersey Constitution and that the Legislature 
“apparent[ly] fail[ed] to follow the proscribed procedures for the 
adoption of evidence rules under the Evidence Act of 1960.”156 
                                                          
152 Id. at *9. A seemingly exasperated court exclaimed, “[W]e are unsure 
what to make of this hodgepodge of labels.” Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. For example, the record was silent on how the functions and 
authority of Valley’s “Patient Safety Director” (created pursuant to the PSA) 
corresponded to the other “related ongoing [peer-review] operations within 
the hospital.” Id. 
155 Id. at *11. 
156 Id. at *8 n.8; see N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 11, cl. 3 (providing that 
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However, the court declined to comment further because neither 
party challenged the PSA on separation of powers grounds.157 
B. Remand: Judge Reddin’s Opinion 
On remand, Valley asserted that only two out of six 
documents were deserving of PSA protection: a summary of a 
roundtable discussion convened by the hospital’s Director of 
Patient Safety to engage in a self-critical analysis of the 
Applegrad occurrence (“DV2”) and a document which 
memorialized specific activities conducted following the 
roundtable discussion (“DV5”).158 Following in camera 
inspection, testimony of hospital officials, and several days of 
oral arguments, the trial judge, the Honorable Raymond A. 
Reddin, delivered an oral ruling.159 While recognizing “some 
inconsistency between Christy and the language of the statute,”160 
he nonetheless ruled that the intent of the PSA was to allow 
individuals to “speak freely without a fear of retribution” and 
therefore the self-critical analysis documents created pursuant to 
the Act were “entitled to a full privilege and no Christy analysis 
is warranted.”161 Nonetheless, the judge held this absolute 
                                                          
“[t]he Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all 
courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all 
such courts”). The Evidence Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-33–34 (West 
2011) mandates special procedures to ensure that rules of evidence be 
adopted only through the joint collaboration of all three branches of 
government. See State v. Byrd, 967 A.2d 285, 294–97 (N.J. 2009) 
(discussing the history of and rationale for the Rules of Evidence).  
157 Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8. 
158 See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad II), 51 A.3d 119, 
129 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (“Defendants, on reflection, modified 
their earlier position that all of the withheld documents were privileged under 
the PSA, and instead limited their claims of PSA confidentiality to exhibits 
DV2 and DV5.”). See subheadings “DV2” and “DV5,” id. at 132–33, 
detailing the purpose of each document. 
159 Stenographic Transcript of Proceedings Decision, Sept. 12, 2011, 
Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, No. PAS-L-908-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. Sept. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Sept. 12 Record]. 
160 Id. at 26. 
161 Id. at 31.  
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privilege be construed narrowly.162 As such, the judge ordered 
the disclosure of the names of the participants and the date of 
the discussion in DV2.163 He also ruled that the statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague and that because “[the] Legislature 
showed respect to the Supreme Court” in acknowledging 
Christy, the PSA did not violate separation of powers 
principles.164 
The judge then turned to the documents in question. Having 
interpreted the PSA to create a full privilege, the judge was left 
to fashion an appropriate test for when to actually apply the 
privilege. The judge concluded that, notwithstanding Valley’s 
failure to report the incident, Valley had prepared DV2 in “good 
faith” and “substantial[ly] compli[ed]” with the PSA, and thus 
was entitled to the protections of the statute.165 Nonetheless, the 
judge suggested that the eventual trial judge, as “gatekeeper,” 
should have a copy of the confidential documents to ensure that 
no eventual witness gives testimony contradicting the document 
because “the court can never function in a way [allowing the 
presentation of] improper testimony.”166 The judge reasoned that 
this caveat was simply a matter of judicial “integrity.”167 On the 
other hand, the judge found DV5 to be a “Risk Management” or 
                                                          
162 Id. at 50–51. 
163 As support, the judge cited a prior New Jersey case ordering an 
attorney to reveal the address of a client, attorney-client privilege 
notwithstanding. See id. at 52–53 (citing Horon Holding Corp. v. McKenzie, 
775 A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)). That the judge felt 
compelled to utilize case precedent dealing with an entirely different privilege 
should indicate the novelty of the legal questions presented in Applegrad.  
164 Id. at 39.  
165 Id. at 51. If, on the other hand, the judge detected “bad faith or fraud 
or concealment or a cover up . . . . [The protection] could be lost and the 
sanction should be beyond [the hospital] paying a fine. Paying a fine does 
nothing to the person who had treatment and had a concealment occur . . . .” 
Id. 
166 Id. at 61–62. 
167 Id. The judge also suggested the appointment of a “discovery master” 
to monitor the process and to “see if there’s any problems that are later 
developed.” Stenographic Transcript of Proceedings Supplemental Decision at 
24, Sept. 14, 2011, Applegrad, No. PAS-L-908-08 [hereinafter Sept. 14 
Record]. 
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“Quality Assurance document,” developed independent of the 
PSA and was therefore subject to a Christy analysis.168  
Remarkably, the judge found that the PSA “has done nothing 
to change the pre-Patient Safety Act statutes and regulations 
. . . . All the Patient Safety Act does is encourage more 
reporting and how things are reported to create an atmosphere of 
trust.”169 Specifically with regard to Valley, the court found no 
“tremendous difference in the way [it] investigated incidents 
before and after the [PSA].”170  
Both parties appealed different aspects of Judge Reddin’s 
ruling.171 Judge Reddin remarked that the “entire medical 
community” and the “lawyers associated with it” are “looking to 
see if this statute is going to be validated or invalidated [and] 
. . . if there really will be confidentiality.”172 
C. Appellate Decision: Discarding “Substantial Compliance” 
for “Exclusivity”  
On August 9, 2012, in Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, 
the Appellate Division held that the PSA’s “repeated emphasis 
on confidentiality . . . cannot be reconciled with plaintiffs’ claim 
                                                          
168 Sept. 14 Record, supra note 167, at 16. 
169 Id. at 12. 
170 Id. at 6. 
171 Plaintiffs in particular argued that the trial judge’s interpretation of the 
PSA would render it unconstitutional—if the PSA did indeed create an 
absolute self-critical analysis privilege, it thus constituted a legislative 
overruling of Payton, in which the Supreme Court declined to recognize one. 
The trial court therefore “should have rejected . . . that the legislature could 
so cavalierly and vaguely create a new privilege . . . . [I]f the Legislature did 
[so] . . . without consultation with the Court,” it was in violation of the 
Constitution and the Evidence Act. Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Merit Brief at 37–
38, Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad II), 51 A.3d 119 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). The New Jersey Supreme Court, to date, has 
not ruled on whether Christy was correctly decided. Certification in 
Applegrad was granted on December 6, 2012, and the court will hear 
argument later this year. One likely issue is whether the court will be 
“bound” by the Appellate Division’s holding in Christy, now that the 
Legislature has enshrined it in the PSA. 
172 Sept. 12 Record, supra note 159, at 62–63. 
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that the PSA’s non-disclosure protections must yield to the 
exceptions set forth in Christy.”173 As for the inclusion of 
subsection (k), the court reasoned that  
[T]he Legislature appears to have adopted a dual 
approach, i.e., (1) treating materials exclusively 
developed under the PSA as subject to the PSA’s specific 
confidentiality terms; and (2) treating other internal 
materials that are not exclusively developed under the 
PSA pursuant to the residual common-law standards set 
forth in Christy or other law.”174  
The court thus held that “the PSA extends absolute 
confidential protection to ‘all documents . . .’ developed 
exclusively . . . through the PSA process.”175 The court made 
clear the privilege existed “regardless of a plaintiff’s asserted 
need for disclosure and regardless of whether the documents 
contain factual information in addition to subjective opinions.”176 
However, the court issued a crucial caveat:  
If, however, such items have been created or developed 
through some other “source or context,” then they are 
obtainable under the criteria governing such alternative 
situations. . . . Thus, if a participant in the PSA process 
obtains facts or opinions from other sources or contexts, 
such as peer-review material from the facility’s 
continuous quality improvement program, those facts or 
opinions are not transformed into inaccessible “PSA 
materials.” . . . .  
 The confidentiality of a particular fact or opinion 
under the PSA therefore hinges upon an exclusivity test, 
requiring the court to consider whether the item was 
developed solely under the procedures set forth in the 
PSA, or whether the item had an independent genesis.177 
                                                          
173 Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 138. 
174 Id. at 138–39. 
175 Id. at 139 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-12.25(f)–(g) (West 
2007 & Supp. 2012)). 
176 Id. at 123.  
177 Id. at 139 (emphasis added). 
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The court also made clear that “nothing in the PSA insulates 
the underlying facts relating to a patient mishap, if those facts 
can be learned from an independent source.”178 Rather, the PSA 
protects the committee’s self-critical communications.179 The 
court also warned that its “construction of the PSA is not an 
invitation to health care providers to shield information that was 
previously accessible under Christy or under other law by 
indiscriminately labeling such formerly accessible items as ‘PSA 
material’” or “to evade the limitations of [the Act] by giving job 
titles to hospital personnel such as ‘PSA officers’ when, in fact, 
they are performing functions that are not truly covered by the 
PSA.”180 Echoing its statement a year earlier enshrining 
substance over form,181 the court focused its inquiry on “the 
actual functions and activities involved, rather than the 
nomenclature adopted.”182 
Applying these principles to the documents at hand, the 
Appellate Division proceeded to reverse Judge Reddin’s rulings, 
determining that DV2 should be made available to the 
plaintiffs.183 The court also upheld the constitutionality of the 
                                                          
178 Id. at 140 (emphasis added). “For example, if counsel for a medical 
malpractice plaintiff deposes employees within the hospital having personal 
knowledge about a patient’s care, those witnesses cannot refuse to answer 
factual questions because those same facts also had been made known to the 
hospital’s patient safety committee.” Id. 
179 Id. (“[W]hat the PSA guards against is the disclosure of 
communications made within the PSA process itself, including the self-critical 
and deliberative analyses that are undertaken by a patient safety committee.” 
(emphasis added)).  
180 Id. at 140–41. 
181 See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad I), No. L-0908-
08, 2011 WL 13700, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 5, 2011) (holding 
that the “mere labeling of a hospital document does not necessarily control its 
legal classification . . . just as the stamping of a document as ‘attorney-client’ 
or ‘work-product’ does not ensure that the privilege was appropriately 
invoked”). 
182 Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 141. 
183 Id. While conceding that the hospital attempted to comply with the 
Act “in good faith,” the court was specifically troubled by the fact that the 
roundtable discussion was staffed by nonphysicians and that the committee 
chose not to refer the matter to the Patient Safety Committee, despite the 
gravity of the incident implicating physician error. Id. at 144. 
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PSA (essentially answering the question it raised a year earlier), 
noting that “the Legislature has codified other evidentiary 
privileges in the past without the Judiciary’s involvement” and 
that “[g]iven this backdrop of constitutional and legal history, 
we decline to pronounce the confidentiality provisions in the 
PSA an invalid exercise of legislative power.”184 
Defendants filed a motion for leave to appeal to the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, arguing that the Appellate Division’s 
holding, which in their view imposed additional restrictions on 
providers, should not apply retroactively to the specific 
documents at issue in Applegrad.185 Tellingly, and quite 
understandably, defendants did not appeal the Appellate 
Division’s overall interpretation of the statute.186 The recognition 
of an “absolute” PSA privilege will remain the law of the land, 
for now.187 
                                                          
184 Id. at 145–46; see also id. at 146 (“[T]he ultimate assessment of this 
constitutional question is best reserved to the Supreme Court, as the final 
arbiter of the boundaries among our three branches of State government.”). 
185 See Brief of Defendants-Appellants in Support of Motion for Leave to 
Appeal at 1–2, Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, No. A-1261-11T1 (N.J. 
Dec. 4, 2012). 
186 See Alicia Gallegos, Patient Safety Law Protects Some Documents in 
Court Case, AM. ASS’N MED. NEWS (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2012/08/27/prsd0829.htm (quoting Applegrad defense 
attorney stating that she was “gratified that the court upheld the privilege” 
and that “[i]t was wonderful to see that what hospitals, physicians and nurses 
had been concerned about for decades has the ability to go forward [and] 
improve health care”). 
187 In December 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted 
defendants’ motion for leave to appeal. Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila, 
2012 N.J. LEXIS 1257 (N.J. 2012). Because the issue of “retroactivity” 
presented to the court is a fairly narrow one, NJHA is no longer involved as 
amicus in the case. E-mail from Ross Lewin, Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, 
to author (Oct. 17, 2012) (on file with author).  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. An Analytical Misfit in the Family of Privileges  
The drafters of the PSA should have foreseen that their self-
critical analysis privilege, by its own terms, was destined to 
unleash trouble. As argued in Parts I and II of this Note, the 
self-critical analysis privilege, as applied in both the federal 
system and New Jersey, was always “qualified.” Hence, courts 
assessed self-critical analysis on a case-by-case basis. The 
privilege could be overcome through the showing of a litigant’s 
exceptional need, and even if applied in a given case, the 
privilege would not protect facts from disclosure. This dynamic 
is in stark contrast to long-established “unqualified” privileges, 
such as the attorney-client or spousal varieties, in which courts 
refuse to allow for compromise, no matter how compelling the 
need, correctly recognizing that allowing for equitable 
“exceptions” would undermine the underlying relationships the 
privilege was designed to protect.  
This Note therefore suggests that much of the controversy 
surrounding self-critical analysis is rooted in its unfortunate and 
erroneous description as a “privilege,” when a much more 
accurate descriptor would be “protection.” In determining 
whether a piece of evidence is privileged, a court should not 
consider the hardship an opposing party may endure. A 
thorough balancing of the positive and negative practical 
outcomes of recognizing a privilege is surely a crucial 
undertaking, but this must occur at the initial privilege-creating 
stage, not during its application.188 As the Upjohn Court 
succinctly stated, “an uncertain privilege, or one which purports 
to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the 
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”189 
New Jersey and federal courts simply have not approached 
self-critical analysis doctrine with this level of deference. The 
“uncertainty” endemic to any qualified privilege has been one of 
                                                          
188 See supra Part I. See generally The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 
supra note 44, at 1097–99. 
189 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
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the defining characteristics of self-critical analysis. For example, 
the Dowling court declined to extend self-critical analysis 
protection to the defendant’s safety-review documents because 
they “will be invaluable to a plaintiff attempting to prove that 
his injury was caused by the company’s negligent failure to 
make safe a hazardous condition.”190 (One could hardly imagine 
a court ordering disclosure of attorney-client or confidential 
psychiatric material because it would be “invaluable” to an 
adversary’s case.) Even the Bredice court, which applied the 
privilege—and which, incidentally, referred to it as 
“qualified”—did so because it felt plaintiff failed to show “good 
cause” to discover the materials.191 For the self-critical analyzer 
to confidently predict whether a hypothetical discoverer will 
successfully argue “good cause” in front of a randomly chosen 
judge or magistrate seems next to impossible.  
Similarly, in New Jersey, the three-part balancing test 
established in McClain emphasized the discoverer’s 
“particularized need” for the self-critical materials,192 while 
Payton emphasized the court’s role in overseeing an “exquisite 
weighing process” in determining whether to shield 
documents.193 For example, in Christy, the court refused 
disclosure of opinions of the committee, noting that the plaintiff 
had already retained experts to support his medical malpractice 
claim, but allowed for discovery of other portions which it 
believed could reasonably lead to discovery and which would 
not prejudice defendant. Finally, the current approach in the 
District of New Jersey, which borrows from both New Jersey 
and federal law, employs a six-part self-critical analysis test, 
which emphasizes equity balancing at virtually every stage.194  
                                                          
190 Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(emphasis added).  
191 Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970) 
(“Absent evidence of extraordinary circumstances, there is no good cause 
shown requiring disclosure of the minutes of these meetings.”). 
192 McClain v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 993 (N.J. 1985). 
193 Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 331 (N.J. 1997) (quoting 
Loigman v. Kimmelman, 505 A.2d 958, 964 (N.J. 1986)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
194 See, e.g., Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health Inc., No. 04-
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This sampling of several self-critical analysis approaches 
shows that courts do not treat it like a privilege. A true 
“privilege” subject to such a murky and fact-sensitive post hoc 
inquiry would seemingly deter the self-critical analyst from the 
outset.195 Rather, self-critical analysis is better understood as 
analogous to the work-product doctrine, which offers protections 
against discovery of certain material but will not overcome a 
discoverer’s showing of “substantial” or “compelling” need.196  
In legislating that the self-critical materials would not be 
discoverable in “any” litigation, thus creating an unbending rule 
that did not have built-in “substantial need” exceptions or 
fact/evaluation distinctions, the drafters of the PSA rested on the 
unfounded premise that the self-critical analysis protection could 
be codified like any other privilege. As such, they morphed a 
flexible common law rule of discovery into an inflexible 
statutory mandate.197  
B. Reforming Tort Law Through Evidence Law 
The PSA drafters also acted from the well-intentioned yet 
mistaken belief that their vision of a patient safety regime could 
be reconciled with both the liberal rules of civil discovery, in 
which absolute privileges are disfavored, and the traditional 
American tort model, in which medical errors are deterred 
                                                          
6025, 2006 WL 2946469, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2006) (“When analyzing 
whether the self critical analysis privilege is applicable, a court must balance 
(1) whether the information is the result of a self critical analysis undertaken 
by the party seeking protection, (2) the extent to which the information is 
available from other sources, (3) the degree of harm the litigant will suffer 
from the information’s unavailability, (4) the possible prejudice to the party 
asserting the privilege, (5) the public interest in preserving the free flow of 
the type of information sought, and (6) whether the information is of the type 
whose flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed.”). 
195 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
196 See Flanagan, supra note 40, at 575.  
197 See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
¶ 26.48 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2013) (“That judicial decisions have been 
uneven both in their willingness to recognize a privilege for self-critical 
analysis and in their ability to define its scope is a predictable consequence of 
its common law roots.”). 
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through fear that an injured patient, empowered with broad 
discovery rights, will bring suit. Patient safety, as a legal 
principle, is adverse to private tort litigation because the former 
seeks to improve overall health outcomes for patients at the 
expense of an individual patient’s discovery rights, while the 
latter supports the belief that allowing a patient to discover the 
truth of what happened in her case will improve overall 
outcomes. As Commissioner Lacy testified in his endorsement of 
the PSA, “the focus on finding who did wrong rather than why 
things go wrong is the major obstacle in improving safety across 
this country.”198 One could dismiss the Commissioner’s opinions 
during committee hearings as irrelevant in evaluating legislative 
intent.199 But there is no escaping that the “Findings and 
Declarations” portion of the statute itself called for combating 
“punitive environments,” which it contended “are not 
particularly effective in promoting accountability and increasing 
patient safety, and may be a deterrent to the exchange of 
information.”200 The inclusion of these portions in the bill 
reflects the underlying policy judgments of the bill’s drafters to 
create a complete self-critical analysis privilege.201 Supporters of 
the bill should have anticipated the Act would frustrate a 
plaintiff/patient’s opportunity to access relevant evidence. 
To be sure, the Legislature attempted to placate various 
interest groups by including the reference to Christy in the actual 
statute text, implying the privilege would maintain its common 
law qualified status.202 But as both Judge Reddin and the 
Appellate Division have made clear, the principles embedded in 
Christy are simply inconsistent with the overall intent of the 
                                                          
198 See Assembly Hearing, supra note 135, at 15 (emphasis added). 
199 Justice Scalia put the matter rather bluntly in Zedner v. United States, 
547 U.S. 489, 511 (Scalia, J., concurring): “[T]he use of legislative history 
is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute.” 
200 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(e) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
201 See, e.g., Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad II), 51 
A.3d 119, 138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (observing that § 26:2H-
12.24 expresses “clear policy objectives to provide greater incentives . . . to 
disclose mishaps and perceived risks to patient safety” and is thus 
incompatible with the “balancing criteria of Christy”). 
202 See supra Part III. 
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PSA.203 A review of both the legislative history and the plain 
meaning of the statute indicates that applying a Christy-like 
qualified privilege to PSA materials would thwart the Act’s 
explicit goal to afford such documents the simple yet absolute 
cloak of confidentiality. The only fair conclusion is that, while 
individual drafters or supporters of the bill may have hoped 
otherwise, the PSA has limited a patient/plaintiff’s “private 
right” of discovery204 in its attempt to further the broader societal 
good of improving patient safety.  
Understood another way, the Legislature has unleashed a 
subtle brand of tort reform.205 Proponents of reform argue that 
an aggressive tort system, which in theory purports to deter 
unsafe practices and conduct, can actually yield perverse 
incentives. In the healthcare context, providers will rationally be 
reluctant to engage in conduct benefitting the patient’s or 
public’s interest (such as error-reporting) if it could foreseeably 
expose them to liability.206  
                                                          
203 See Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 146–47 (holding that PSA’s “repeated 
emphasis on confidentiality cannot be reconciled with plaintiffs’ claim that the 
PSA’s non-disclosure protections must yield to the exceptions set forth in 
Christy”); Sept. 12 Record, supra note 159, at 31 (holding that PSA 
documents are “entitled to a full privilege and no Christy analysis is 
warranted”). 
204 See Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937, 940 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2004) (referring to a medical-malpractice plaintiff’s right to discovery as a 
private interest, which, unlike those of a civil rights plaintiff, “does not have 
the ‘strong . . . reflection of important public policies’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 333 (N.J. 
1997))). 
205 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining tort reform as 
“[a] movement to reduce the amount of tort litigation, usu. involving 
legislation that restricts tort remedies or that caps damages awards (esp. for 
punitive damages)” and noting that “[a]dvocates of tort reform argue that it 
lowers insurance and healthcare costs and prevents windfalls, while 
opponents contend that it denies plaintiffs the recovery they deserve for their 
injuries”). 
206 See generally David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of 
Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem 
or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 909–14 (2005) 
(discussing the “conventional wisdom” that “malpractice liability impedes 
efforts to improve patient safety”). As one nursing expert put it, “The threat 
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Clearly, this same argument serves not only as a rationale 
for traditional tort reform, but also for strong self-critical 
analysis protection. While the majority of tort reform has 
focused on limiting a defendant’s exposure to damage awards, 
often through the institution of a noneconomic recovery cap207 or 
through the abolishment of common law joint and several 
liability,208 the PSA seeks to redress the perceived excesses of 
the tort system through utilizing rules of evidence. Therefore, in 
a typical tort reform jurisdiction, a healthcare provider (and its 
insurer or indemnifier) could rest assured that damages would 
not exceed a specified sum per accident. The PSA’s self-critical 
analysis protection, on the other hand, does not limit liability per 
se. Instead, it attempts to further the goal of both the tort reform 
and the patient safety movements—encouraging the reporting of 
errors—by rendering such reports immune to discovery.  
C. What Has Changed—And What Will Change—Under the 
PSA? 
The PSA’s privilege was predicated on the finding that self-
critical analysis could not occur without complete 
confidentiality.209 Admittedly, the belief that providers fail to 
                                                          
of medical malpractice litigation is one of the most obvious barriers to the 
improvement of patient safety. . . . These risks also serve as disincentives to 
participate in improvement strategies to reduce the risk of error.” Id. at 911 
(quoting Beverly Jones, Nurses and the “Code of Silence,” in MEDICAL 
ERROR: WHAT DO WE KNOW? WHAT DO WE DO? 84, 91–92 (Marilynn 
Rosenthal & Kathleen Sutcliffe eds., 2002)). 
207 See Noneconomic Damages Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, 
http://www.atra.org/issues/noneconomic-damages-reform (last visited Feb. 
24, 2013) (identifying statutory reforms enacted by state). 
208 See, e.g., Joint and Several Liability Rule Reform, AM. TORT 
REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/issues/joint-and-several-liability-rule-
reform (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (identifying statutory reforms enacted by 
state). 
209 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26.2H-12.24(2)(f) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012) 
(creating “confidential disclosure” processes, thus providing the State with a 
means to “increase the amount of information on systems failures, analyze 
the sources of these failures and disseminate information on effective 
practices for reducing systems failures”); Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila 
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report errors out of fear of liability, in the words of one public 
health scholar, “is plausible and has intuitive appeal.”210 Still, 
there is reason to be skeptical. One 2005 study found an absence 
of “any rigorous evidence show[ing] that fear of malpractice 
lawsuits discourages error reporting” and that “contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, malpractice liability itself has the potential 
to kick-start quality improvement.”211 For example, rocketing 
malpractice premiums in the 1980s (due to anesthesia-related 
deaths) impelled the American Society of Anesthesiologists to 
launch an aggressive “patient safety campaign” to study 
incidents of medical errors in the field.212 “By the early 1980s, 
anesthesiologists recognized that something drastic had to be 
done if they were going to continue to be insured,” recalled the 
leader of this movement.213 The campaign, while costly, proved 
remarkably successful and has caused an astonishing ten-to-
twenty-fold decrease in deaths over the past few decades.214 
Further, failure to report errors may simply be a deeply 
rooted cultural phenomenon rather than an economically rational 
response to fears of liability. For example, one health scholar 
cited to a survey showing that seventy-five percent of U.S. 
doctors failed to report errors to their patients, which was not 
markedly different from a showing of sixty-one percent in New 
Zealand, “a country that has had no-fault malpractice insurance 
for more than three decades.”215 
                                                          
(Applegrad II), 51 A.3d 119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) 
(observing that “the Legislature was manifestly concerned” about the 
underreporting and analysis of adverse incidents in New Jersey resulting from 
the “inhibition” of medical staff from “reporting or criticizing unsafe 
practices within the institution”); id. at 127 (observing that “the PSA’s 
umbrella of confidentiality” was designed, among other reasons, “to foster 
internal self-critical analysis”). 
210 Annas, supra note 119, at 2065. 
211 Hyman & Silver, supra note 206, at 894. 
212 Id. at 919. 
213 Id. at 920 (quoting Ellison C. Pierce, Jr., ASA Monitoring Guidelines: 
Their Origin and Development, 66 AM. SOC’Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS NEWSL., 
Sept. 2002, at 22, 22, available at http://www.asahq.org/Newsletters/ 
2002/9_02/feature7.htm). 
214 Id. at 918. 
215 See Annas, supra note 119, at 2065. 
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Some scholars also question whether privileges actually 
enhance the frequency and quality of patient safety procedures. 
For example, Susan Scheutzow, a health law practitioner and 
academic, through analyzing the National Practitioner Data 
Bank, found that peer-review protections, contrary to perceived 
wisdom, do not promote the public policy of encouraging peer 
review and thus “risk being little more than special interest laws 
protecting physicians and hospitals.”216 Scheutzow therefore 
argued for the elimination—or at the very least, reformation—of 
such laws.217  
In light of these general claims, one must ask what the PSA 
has accomplished thus far. From a large-scale public policy 
perspective, it is too early to tell. Nonetheless, the Applegrad 
litigation has brought to light at least one useful case study—the 
patient safety apparatus of Valley Hospital.  
This much is clear: the Appellate Division recognized that 
many regulatory and professional standards already existed prior 
to passage of the PSA, many of which called for peer review 
and self-evaluation procedures quite similar to those required by 
the PSA.218 On remand, and following days of oral arguments 
and document inspection, Judge Reddin concluded that he could 
discern “no tremendous difference” between Valley’s procedures 
prior to and following the PSA. As the judge noted, this reality 
does not in itself raise any presumptions of wrongdoing; to the 
contrary, it might even show that Valley was ahead of the curve 
in patient safety. Yet perhaps even more remarkably, the judge 
further found that the PSA “has done nothing” to change pre-
PSA regulations and that “all the Patient Safety Act does is 
encourage more reporting . . . to create an atmosphere of 
trust.”219 
One must therefore consider the irony that the PSA may 
ultimately result in a raw deal for patients—as a result of a 
codified and absolute self-critical analysis privilege, they may 
                                                          
216 Scheutzow, supra note 5, at 8–9.  
217 Id. at 8. 
218 See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad I), No. L-0908-
08, 2011 WL 13700, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 5, 2011); see 
also supra Part IV. 
219 Sept. 14 Record, supra note 167, at 12.  
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discover less as litigants. At the same time, as hospitals continue 
to engage in procedures virtually identical to those prior to the 
PSA, they will get little added safety in return. 
Providers, on the other hand, may have much to gain. 
Initially, Valley asserted that all six of the suppressed materials 
were privileged under the PSA.220 Following the Law Division’s 
ruling that “the mere labeling of a hospital document does not 
necessarily control its legal classification,” Valley changed 
course and instead argued that only two documents were “PSA” 
materials deserving of a full privilege, conceding that the rest 
could be subject to a Christy analysis.221 This author wonders 
whether other providers have taken note of Applegrad and have, 
as a result, attempted to reconfigure their existing peer review 
and adverse occurrence procedures in order to be afforded the 
maximum level of protection. Thus, a hospital would prudently 
comply with any requisite PSA formalities—however minor and 
inconsequential they may be to actual patient safety—simply in 
order to demonstrate that it has complied with the statute. 
Procedures that could have been introduced for a variety of 
reasons could overnight become “patient safety” procedures.222 
If a change like this occurs, it could alter the dynamics of 
medical malpractice litigation. In such cases, one side—the 
defendant—will inevitably possess the vast majority of evidence, 
both inculpatory and exculpatory.223 Plaintiffs therefore rely on a 
                                                          
220 Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *2. 
221 This salient fact was not lost on the Appellate Division the second 
time around. See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad II), 51 A.3d 
119, 143 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (“The Hospital exhibited its 
confusion about the PSA in this very litigation by first asserting other 
privileges and not invoking the PSA; then arguing, after the trial court’s 
initial in camera review, that all of the withheld documents were protected by 
the PSA; and ultimately arguing on remand that only DV2 and DV5 are 
covered by the PSA.”). 
222 Alternatively, the Appellate Division’s “exclusivity test” could result 
in an unintended irony: hospitals which (laudably) enacted comprehensive 
patient safety procedures prior to enactment of the PSA will now be punished 
for their foresight because their initially voluntary practices, now mandated 
by the PSA, are not “exclusively” a PSA product and are thus not entitled to 
the statutory privilege.  
223 See, e.g., Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937, 940 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
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liberal discovery system to ensure the disclosure of every 
possibly relevant document and the deposition of every possible 
witness. As the Christy court made clear, a plaintiff has good 
cause to discover nearly all hospital documentation concerning 
an adverse event, even if the facts are available from alternate 
sources, because of the possibility of uncovering “subtle 
differences in both testimony and documented facts, which 
support an argument bearing on credibility.”224 Therefore, a 
plaintiff’s incentives could change if certain hospital documents 
become increasingly less available. Under an “absolute” PSA 
regime, an incident at a hospital that prompts many peer review 
and patient safety sessions will not necessarily imply that there 
will be an opportunity for broad discovery of these documents.225 
As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be more reluctant to take 
on cases where negligence (or, for that matter, outright fraud or 
cover-up) must be argued circumstantially: for example, through 
showing inconsistencies in deposition testimony and patient 
safety documents. 
There is, of course, a counterargument. While the plaintiffs’ 
bar may feel that the patient safety movement is simply tort 
reform in disguise,226 a regime emphasizing the importance of 
                                                          
App. Div. 2004) (observing that critical evidence regarding claims of medical 
malpractice “would logically be expected to be in the possession of an 
adversary”). 
224 Id. at 941–42. 
225 One plaintiff’s attorney, in commenting on Applegrad, opined that:  
[T]rying to get discovery from some hospitals is like trying to find 
the proverbial needle in a haystack. Except you are first told that: (a) 
there is no haystack; (b) if there ever was a haystack, it did not have 
any needles; and finally (c) if there was a haystack with a needle, 
any discussion of it is privileged. If you persist, you are then advised 
that (d) all haystacks and needles were designed, manufactured, 
distributed, maintained and utilized by persons who were 
independent contractors and, furthermore, (e) the hospital is entitled 
to a limitation of liability. 
Abbot S. Brown, Hospital Malpractice: Finding the Needle in the Haystack, 
N.J.L.J, May 30, 2011, at 1. 
226 See generally Peter P. Budetti, Tort Reform and the Patient Safety 
Movement: Seeking Common Ground, 293 JAMA 2660, 2618 (2005) (drawing 
parallels between the results of tort reform and the patient safety movement). 
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patient safety may in fact be more willing to entertain novel 
claims of relief for plaintiffs. The health law and bioethics 
scholar George Annas, in The Patient’s Right to Safety—
Improving the Quality of Care Through Litigation Against 
Hospitals,227 argues that: 
[J]udicial recognition of an explicit “right to safety” for 
hospital patients, with a correlative duty of hospitals to 
implement patient-safety measures, can become the 
primary motivator for the development of systems to 
improve patient safety. Hospitals that do not take specific 
actions to improve safety should be viewed as negligent 
and be subject to malpractice lawsuits when a violation of 
the right to safety results in injury.228 
Annas suggests that physicians, patients, and the plaintiffs’ 
bar join forces to propose initiatives to “pressure hospitals to 
change their operating systems” to ensure patient safety.229 
Annas’s argument is important because it reaffirms an obvious 
principle of tort law that the PSA minimized: a robust tort 
system that constantly patrols for incidents of fault, a system 
that (to use the disapproving language of the PSA) cultivates a 
“punitive culture” focusing on “assigning blame,”230 can actually 
promote, not hinder, the development and implementation of 
innovative safety procedures. Plaintiffs’ lawyers may therefore 
experiment with new patient-safety-oriented claims for relief in 
cases where more traditional negligence theories may be difficult 
to prove.  
Finally, how will the PSA affect judges? If the statute’s 
absolute privilege is upheld, judges will be deprived of the 
opportunity to engage in the fact-sensitive and context-oriented 
balancing that previously existed under the common law. 
Instead, and as occurred in Applegrad, a court’s “exquisite 
weighing process” will give way to the more rigid, yet still 
complex, task of determining whether the defendant hospital has 
in “good faith” “substantially complied” with the Act; or, 
                                                          
227 Annas, supra note 119. 
228 Id. at 2063. 
229 Id. at 2066. 
230 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26.2H-12.24(e) (West 2007 & Supp. 2012). 
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according to the Appellate Division’s test, whether the alleged 
privileged material was created “exclusively” for PSA 
functions.231 Decades of self-critical analysis jurisprudence and 
case law will now be of little use to judges confronted with 
assertions of a PSA privilege.  
On the other hand, perhaps not much will change after all. 
Judges, now tasked with determining the contours of the statute, 
may develop their own “exquisite weighing process” in 
evaluating whether to apply the privilege. First, as the litigation 
in Applegrad made clear, merely distinguishing between PSA 
documents and related patient-safety/peer-review materials was 
itself a controversial and fact-sensitive inquiry.232 Second, the 
Appellate Division imposed several requirements on providers, 
such as the “exclusivity” test, or the requirement that 
“competent” personnel of “various disciplines” administer the 
reviews.233 A court will find it difficult to determine whether a 
hospital complied with these requirements, and if the facts of 
Applegrad are any indicator, it will require days of testimony 
(and cross-examination) of hospital staff.234 How can hospitals be 
sure that their patient safety documents will be deemed 
absolutely privileged in the future, and if they cannot be sure, 
will that reality, in and of itself, frustrate the PSA’s primary 
goal of encouraging frank discussions and full disclosure? As 
one commentator predicts, “Due to the highly fact specific 
analysis undertaken by the Court in [Applegrad] and apparently 
to be applied by the courts considering the application of this 
privilege, uncertainty will remain as to the ultimate outcome in 
any given scenario.”235 Yet, as this Note has described, 
                                                          
231 See Applegrad ex rel. C.A. v. Bentolila (Applegrad II), 51 A.3d 119, 
139 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (“[W]hether the item had an 
independent genesis [aside from the PSA] . . . at times . . . may be obvious. 
At other times, it might not, and would require closer scrutiny of how each 
particular fact or opinion was created.”). 
232 See id. at 128. 
233 Id. at 141–42. 
234 Id. at 129 (“On remand, the trial court heard testimony over seven 
days from persons at the Hospital who were involved in the development of 
the allegedly privileged records.”). 
235 Sharlene Hunt, Court Addresses Confidentiality Under the Patient 
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“uncertainty” has always been the predominant dynamic of self-
critical analysis. Perhaps the ambiguous patient safety dynamics 
that existed under the common law will continue under this new 
PSA regime, simply under a new name. The Appellate Division 
made the unassailable point that a hospital’s “mere labeling” of 
a document as “privileged” counts for very little.236 So too, the 
Appellate Division’s recognition of the PSA privilege as being 
“absolute” will be of little significance to providers and 
plaintiffs in light of the significant caveats the court imposed. 
D. Potential for Future Patient Safety: Rule 407 
This Note concludes by offering an alternative model for 
analyzing self-critical patient safety documents. The fact/opinion 
distinction which governed the majority of critical analysis 
jurisprudence but was discarded under the PSA represents a 
doctrinal and practical compromise for litigants: the discoverer 
will be entitled to crucial pieces of evidence, while his adversary 
can still maintain a degree of confidence that he will not be 
penalized for his investigation. This distinction also recognizes a 
more basic reality of trial practice: sometimes opinions can be 
more damaging than facts.237 This Note therefore suggests that 
the rationale for the self-critical analysis privilege may be better 
served through a different evidentiary paradigm, one recognized 
in virtually every state, as well as under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence: the Subsequent Remedial Measures doctrine.238  
                                                          
Safety Act, N.J. HEALTHCARE BLOG (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.njhealthcareblog.com/2012/08/court-addresses-confidentiality-
under-the-patient-safety-act/. 
236 Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 141 (“What matters for judicial review is the 
actual functions and activities involved, rather than the nomenclature adopted 
by the health care facility.”).  
237 Flanagan, supra note 40, at 576 (“[T]he use of the conclusions of 
such reviews in litigation renders the peer reviewers involuntary experts for 
one of the parties.”); see also Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 
249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970) (“[C]onstructive professional criticism cannot occur 
in an atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor’s suggestion will be used as 
a denunciation of a colleague’s conduct in a malpractice suit.”). 
238 FED. R. EVID. 407 (“Subsequent Remedial Measures”) provides:  
When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or 
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The New Jersey version of this rule provides that 
“[e]vidence of remedial measures taken after an event is not 
admissible to prove that the event was caused by negligence or 
culpable conduct.”239 The rationale for this rule “rests on a 
social policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not 
discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added 
safety.”240 Courts and commentators have recognized the 
parallels between the self-critical analysis privilege and the 
subsequent remedial measures doctrine.241 For example, one 
court recognized that both rules protect parties from the  
Hobson’s choice of aggressively investigating accidents 
. . . , ascertaining the causes and results, and correcting 
the violations or dangerous conditions, but thereby 
creating a self-incriminating record that may be evidence 
of liability, or deliberately avoiding making a record on 
the subject (and possibly leaving the public exposed to 
danger) in order to lessen the risk of civil liability.242  
                                                          
harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove: negligence; culpable conduct; a defect in a 
product or its design; or a need for a warning or instruction. But the 
court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as 
impeachment or—if disputed—proving ownership, control, or the 
feasibility of precautionary measures. 
239 N.J. R. EVID. 407. 
240 FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee’s note. As Baron Bramwell 
described it over a century ago, this rule rejects the idea that “because the 
world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before.” Hart v. 
Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 21 L. Times Rep. (n.s.) 261, 263 (Eng. 1869). 
241 See, e.g., Making Sense of Rules of Privilege, supra note 46, at 1351–
55 (advocating that federal courts evaluate self-critical analysis claims 
utilizing the “activity-privilege” inquiry of Rule 407 rather than the broader 
“relational” privilege rules under Rule 501); see also Reid v. Lockheed 
Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 384 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 2001); 
Capallupo v. FMC Corp., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1193 (D. Minn. 
1988) (noting that a defendant’s claim of self-critical analysis “is perhaps 
most closely related to the philosophy of Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence”). 
242 Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 524 (N.D. 
Fla. 1994). 
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Even in the oft-cited Dowling case, the court recognized that 
“the difference between pre-accident safety reviews and post-
accident investigations is an important one.”243  
To be clear, Rule 407 governs questions of admissibility—it 
is not a privilege—and therefore evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures is still discoverable.244 Consequently, the 
preparer or creator of documents attesting to subsequent 
remedies should not have any reasonable expectation that the 
documents will remain confidential. Still, allowing for the 
discovery, but not the admissibility, of patient safety and peer 
review documents is worth consideration, particularly in New 
Jersey. First, the state’s Patient Bill of Rights empowers patients 
with a “right to know” about the treatment they received.245 But 
on an even more basic level—and as the Christy court put it—
“the search for truth is paramount in the litigation process.”246 A 
patient safety protection structured around Rule 407, rather than 
an absolute privilege, could strike the right balance between an 
injured patient’s right to information and the hospital’s 
confidence that its own safety procedures will not expose them 
to liability.  
The PSA deviated from this “right to know” principle. 
While it mandated facilities to inform patients of any adverse 
events, it simultaneously shielded important documents 
concerning these events. Proponents would argue that this rule is 
vital: in certain circumstances, overall improvements in patient 
safety rely upon the knowledge that certain materials will remain 
inaccessible to an individual patient. The argument is sensible, 
                                                          
243 Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, 971 F.2d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1992). 
244 See 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5291 (2012) (“Rule 407 is a rule of 
admissibility, not a privilege; hence, subsequent remedial measures are 
discoverable.”); see also Donald P. Vandegrift, Jr., The Privilege of Self-
Critical Analysis: A Survey of the Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 171, 189 (“Rule 
407 is not a privilege rule.”). 
245 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8(c) (West 2007). The interplay 
between this statute and the PSA, in this author’s opinion, is ripe for 
litigation and worth further judicial exploration. 
246 Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937, 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2004). 
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but, in this author’s opinion, contrary to goals of patient safety. 
If patients have a right to know every detail of their treatment, 
shouldn’t they also have a right to know what occurred following 
their treatment?  
Consider the case of Esther and Gedalia Applegrad, who, 
aside from their “search for truth” as litigants simply seek 
answers as a mother and father as to why their child’s delivery 
could have gone so horribly wrong.247 Did the hospital evaluate 
the incident, and if so, how rigorously? Did it determine how 
the incident occurred? Was a particular medical staff member to 
blame for the incident, and if so, was the person sanctioned? 
Was he or she involved in prior adverse incidents? Did the staff 
member apologize or concede fault? And most importantly, what 
procedures has the facility instituted or considered instituting to 
ensure that similar errors do not occur in the future? Clearly, 
such evidence should be inadmissible at trial. Still, an injured 
patient deserves to have these questions answered—at least as a 
way to provide a measure of emotional closure and mental 
clarity. Rule 407, which would deem patient safety documents 
discoverable, yet inadmissible, seems to strike a fair and 
reasonable balance.  
To conclude, it is worth returning to one of the Harvard 
Note’s final thoughts: 
A court applying the privilege of self-critical analysis 
should also remember that syllogistic application 
embodies the policy choice of the institution that decided 
to adopt the privilege. In adopting the privilege, a 
determination was made that the public interest weighed 
in favor of confidentiality. Whether this decision was 
made by a higher court, the same court at an earlier 
time, or a legislature, judges should give due weight to 
                                                          
247 See Mary Pat Gallagher, Patient Safety Act Privilege Held Permeable 
in Malpractice Suit, N.J.L.J., Aug. 13, 2012, at 4 (“The Applegrads’ 
lawyer, Cynthia Walters . . . says there was almost no contemporaneous 
record of what happened during the crucial 20-minute delay in resuscitating 
the baby or what happened with the intubation.”). 
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the binding effect of a prior determination that the 
privilege furthers the public interest.248 
The New Jersey Legislature, in passing the PSA, made clear 
its binding public policy determination that materials of self-
critical analysis remain confidential. Courts will do their best to 
elucidate this mandate. Whether the PSA’s “syllogistic 
application” of the privilege will actually promote the principal 
goal of the Act—to improve overall patient safety—remains to be 
seen. 
                                                          
248 The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 44, at 1099 
(emphasis added). 
